

Public narratives and attitudes towards refugees and other migrants

UK country profile – second edition

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Key messages

Most Britons consistently overestimate the number of migrants in the United Kingdom (UK). In 2019, refugees and other migrants accounted for 14% of the UK population, yet the majority of Britons assume that 27% of the UK population are migrants.

The UK is among European countries with the most positive attitudes towards immigration. While Britons hold more negative attitudes towards refugee assistance, there are signs in recent polling data that this is changing.

Since the European Union (EU) referendum, immigration has ranked as a less important issue for the public. Concerns about immigration have fallen to their lowest levels in two decades. Attitudes towards migrants have also shifted from mostly negative to mostly positive, with a notable drop in negative attitudes.

Public narratives on refugees and other migrants are polarised between a ‘threat narrative’ to culture, wealth and security, and a ‘positive narrative’ emphasising the potential benefits of immigration to culture, the economy and society.

Businesses could do more to engage with immigration and highlight the shared benefits of labour mobility for host communities and migrants alike. Migrants have a positive effect on businesses and the wider economy, with a 1% increase in the migrant share of the population creating a 2% increase in income per head.

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About this publication

This briefing presents an overview of the key features of migration and asylum policy in the UK, recent trends in migration patterns, and public perceptions and political narratives on refugees and other migrants. The briefing is an update to the first version, which was published in November 2019. It is part of a wider project supported by the IKEA Foundation aimed at supporting public and private investors interested in engaging with migration and displacement.

Contents

Acknowledgements / i

Display items / iii

1 History of immigration in the UK / 1

2 Current UK immigration system and approach / 3

3 Public attitudes towards refugees and other migrants: what do we know? / 6

4 Two popular narratives / 11

5 Implications for public and private investors / 13

References / 16

Display items

Boxes

Box 1 Overview of UK immigration and asylum policies / 4

Box 2 In focus – UK health and social care / 5

Box 3 Segmentation of the UK population and how positively or negatively they see immigration / 7

Box 4 Examples of good business practice / 14

Figures

Figure 1 Timeline of UK immigration / 1

Figure 2 Long-term migration trends in the UK / 2

Figure 3 Levels of immigration and shifting public attitudes / 6

Figure 4 Salience of immigration as a key issue in the UK / 9

Figure 5 Attitudes towards immigration / 12

1 History of immigration in the UK

The UK has long been a country of immigration, providing refuge and opportunities for refugees and other migrants from all over the world (see Figure 1). In the immediate period after the Second World War, the need for regeneration opened the UK up to those displaced by the war, and to immigration from overseas British territories. This liberalisation continued until legislation restricted immigration from the Commonwealth in 1962.

For much of the 20th century, the numbers migrating to and from the UK were roughly in balance, but from the 1960s to the early 1990s the number of emigrants was often greater than the number of immigrants (Figure 2). This pattern reversed in the mid-1990s, and for the last 25 years or so the UK has seen positive net immigration. As in other countries, patterns of migration are affected by specific events (such as EU enlargement in 2004) and trends in economic growth.

In 2019, refugees and other migrants made up an estimated 14% of the UK’s population (Rienzo and Vargas-Silva, 2020). In the same year, refugees made up around 0.29% of the UK population, with 133,094 refugees and 61,968 pending asylum cases in the country (UNHCR, 2020). According to the Refugee Council (2020), Britain was fifth in Europe for applications for first-time asylum-seekers, below average for applications received per 1,000 population and well below average for applications received in relation to the size of the economy.

Figure 1 Timeline of UK immigration





Figure 2 Long-term migration trends in the UK

Note: Figures used are latest adjusted estimates, not original estimates. The latest figures provided here are for year end March 2020. At the time of writing there were no official migration figures available for 2020–2021.

Source: Office of National Statistics, 2020a

From 1970 onwards there has been a consistent majority opinion for reducing immigration among the British public. Since the turn of the millennium, concern about migrants and refugees has been a dominant feature of British politics (Dempster and Hargrave, 2017). With successive governments failing to meet targets on immigration, the topic of migration has long loomed large, and was a key issue in the Brexit debate and the 2016 referendum, in which the UK voted to leave the EU.

Since the referendum, EU immigration has been on the decline, with 28% fewer National Insurance numbers allocated to EU citizens in 2019 than in 2015. This decline has been compounded by increasing emigration of EU citizens living in the UK, resulting in a 77% decrease in EU net migration – down to 50,000 in 2019 (Vargas-Silva and Walsh, 2020).

The Covid-19 pandemic has also changed migration patterns in the UK, contributing to the return home of EU workers who lost their jobs or wanted to be closer to family. The Oxford Migration Observatory estimates that, in 2020, net migration for EU citizens for the UK was negative for the first time since the early 1990s, with 130,000 more EU citizens leaving the UK than arriving (Parker et al., 2021). Covid-19 has also had an impact on non-EU emigration, with estimates as high as 1.3 million foreign-born residents (EU and non-EU combined) leaving the UK between late 2019 and late 2020 (Brown, 2021).

2 Current UK immigration system and approach

Since 2012, UK immigration policy has been characterised as systemically creating a ‘hostile environment’ for illegal immigrants, aiming to make life ‘so unbearable for undocumented migrants that they would voluntarily choose to leave’ as their access to public services becomes increasingly restricted (University of Portsmouth, 2021: n.p.). One of the most high-profile consequences of the hostile environment policy has been the Windrush scandal. In 2017, it became apparent that hundreds of people who had arrived in the UK between 1948 and 1973 from Caribbean territories – many as children – had been wrongly detained, denied legal rights and, in several dozen cases, wrongly deported by the British government for not having documentation proving their right to remain in the UK. Deemed the Windrush generation after HMT *Empire Windrush*, the ship that brought one of the first cohorts of Caribbean migrants to the UK in 1948, their stories brought national attention to the hostile environment policy. As the 2020 ‘Windrush lessons learned review’ makes clear, the scandal was not an accident, but rather ‘the inevitable result of policies designed to make life impossible for those without the right papers’ (JCWI, n.d.: n.p.).

Other manifestations of the hostile environment policy include long wait times for asylum-seekers who are often kept in appalling conditions, such as the ‘squalid’ conditions of Napier barracks in Kent, which the High Court ruled in June 2021 ‘failed to meet minimum living standards’ (Croft and Wright, 2021: n.p.). Having no recourse to public funds means migrants are unable to access benefits, tax credits and housing assistance, and children of migrants are ineligible for free school meals (University of Portsmouth, 2021). The ‘New Plan for Immigration’ (now the Nationality and Borders Bill), announced in April 2021, serves only to make the UK a more hostile environment, with detention and removal of irregular migrants made easier than before (Hennessey, 2021). The equality impact assessment of the Bill found that the reforms proposed carry ‘significant scope for indirect discrimination’ and ‘potential for direct discrimination on the basis of race’ (Bulman, 2021). Moreover, the Bill seeks to upend current refugee and asylum systems, with only refugees who apply for and receive third-country resettlement before moving to the UK eligible for full refugee protection. Asylum-seekers who make their own way to the UK and apply at the border would no longer be eligible (Rolfe et al., 2021).

UK policy on immigration and asylum distinguishes between EU and non-EU migrants and asylum-seekers, outlined in Box 1. Following post-Brexit immigration policy changes, however, new EU migrants (as opposed to those with ‘settled status’) will be treated the same as non-EU migrants. All migrants must have a visa if they wish to stay in the UK longer than a few months. Visas are subject to a points system based on having a job offer with an appropriate salary, speaking English and having sufficient funds to cover maintenance.

Box 1 Overview of UK immigration and asylum policies

UK citizenship policy. To become a citizen of the UK, generally a person must have lived in the country for at least five years (or three years if their spouse is British), have been granted the status of ‘indefinite leave to remain’ or have pre-settled status under the EU Settlement Scheme for the previous 12 months, meet the English language requirements and pass the ‘Life in the United Kingdom’ test (UK Government, n.d.).

UK asylum policy. Individuals seeking asylum in the UK must apply upon arrival, meet with an immigration officer and undergo an asylum interview with a caseworker. Asylum-seekers are typically not eligible for employment or benefits while awaiting a decision on their application, but can apply for housing and a small weekly cash allowance (£39.63 per person). Decisions on asylum applications usually take longer than six months and can take more than a year if documents need to be verified or further interviews are required, leaving many reliant on charity for survival. If granted refugee status, asylum-seekers become eligible to work in the UK and apply for social benefits (Right to Remain, n.d.).

EU Settlement Scheme. EU citizens who were living in the UK by the end of 2020 were eligible to apply to the EU Settlement Scheme instead of applying for a visa. The application required proof of identity, proof of residence in the UK and the declaration of any criminal convictions (UK Government, 2019). The process, however, was not smooth. The application was complex, with more than 200 pages of guidance published by the Home Office; there has been a backlog of applications, leaving more than 100,000 waiting more than three months for the proof of residency needed to retain their jobs and homes, and many EU citizens did not know they needed to apply (Garcia, 2021).

Immigration policies also have an impact in different sectors and policy areas. Increasing access and facilitating the contribution of migrants to basic services such as health and education may require specific policy interventions and reforms, especially in light of significant changes in immigration patterns. As detailed in Box 2, the health and social care sectors in the UK have been highly reliant on migrant workers. To some extent, this has been addressed through the new points-based immigration system, which introduced a lower salary threshold to accommodate necessary jobs, such as those in the education and healthcare sectors, and offers extra points for jobs in shortage occupations, which at the time of writing includes 10 occupations within health and social care (UK Government, 2020; MAC, 2020). However, most care workers remain below the minimum qualification level for the skilled worker route (Skills for Care, 2020).

Box 2 In focus – UK health and social care

The health and social care sectors are some of the largest in the country, with 1.3 million employed in the NHS and 1.52 million working in adult social care (Skills for Care, 2020). Both health and social care are heavily reliant on migrant workers – with the latest figures showing 21.7% of workers were born outside of the UK (Office of National Statistics, 2020b). As a result, the health and social care sectors are acutely vulnerable to the potential effects of Brexit, with the exacerbation of staffing shortages a major concern. Key trends include:

Widespread staffing shortages, with the need for nurses and adult social care workers the most pressing: The current NHS staffing shortfall of 76,500 equated to 6% of full-time vacancies in hospital and community services between January and March 2021 (Rolewicz and Palmer, 2021). Nurses represent the biggest shortage (ibid.). Similarly, though the workforce has been expanding, it is estimated that 7.3% of roles in adult social care were vacant at any one time in 2019–2020 (112,000 vacancies) – a rate that has risen steadily since 2012–2013 (Skills for Care, 2020). This deficit will be exacerbated by an aging population, which will see a 32% increase in jobs required, or an additional 520,000 jobs, by 2035 (ibid.).


A reliance on migrant workers, particularly migrant workers from the EU: Up until the 2016 referendum, the proportion of EU migrants in the health sector was rising year-on-year at a faster rate than that of non-EU migrants. From 2007 to 2016 the number of nurses and midwives joining the NHS from EU countries went from less than 1,500 to more than 9,000, whereas non-EU migrant nurses joining stayed below 1,000 for five of those 10 years (Rolewicz and Palmer, 2021). Since the referendum this trend has reversed, with a sharp drop in applications from EU migrants across all healthcare roles, though this has to some extent been mitigated by an increase in the number of healthcare workers from non-EU countries (Baird and McKenna, 2019; Baker, 2020; Rolewicz and Palmer, 2021). In the social care sector, there have been longstanding concerns that UK work visa schemes are not able to satisfy demand for migrant workers (Franklin and Urzi Brancati, 2015; Carers UK and CIRCLE, 2018). The reliance on EU workers has also been growing as immigration reforms have limited access of non-EU nationals to work in the social care sector: the proportion of registered nurses of a non-EU nationality, working in social care, has substantially decreased – from 31.3% in 2012/2013 to 19% in 2019/2020 – while the share of nurses who are EU nationals has been rapidly increasing (Skills for Care, 2020). No data has been collected on the settlement status of care workers from EU countries, and the impact of the new requirement for EU nationals to apply and receive settled status is not yet known. The wider impacts of Brexit on the adult social care sector remain to be seen. However, while policy reforms have affected migrant worker pathways from both non-EU and EU countries, it is notable that there is strong public support (77%) for the recruitment of migrant workers in health and social care (Rolfe et al., 2021).

3 Public attitudes towards refugees and other migrants: what do we know?

Opinion polling on attitudes towards refugees and other migrants in the UK dates from as early as 1937 (Ipsos MORI, 2000). As Figure 3 shows, public opposition to immigration and actual levels of immigration do not always correlate. Many Britons also overestimate the number of immigrants in the UK: respondents in a 2018 poll believed that 27% of the population is foreign-born, when the actual number was closer to 13.5% (Ipsos MORI, 2018a).

A major innovation in the use of polling data was introduced in 2011, when HOPE not Hate separated the UK population into ‘tribes’ linked by their attitude to migration rather than their demographic composition (Lowles and Painter, 2011). Since then, the segments have been updated in February 2016, July 2016 and July 2017 (Carter and Lowles, 2017; Carter, 2018). According to this segmentation data, around one-fifth of Britons held negative views towards refugees and other migrants (the ‘Active enmity’ and ‘Latent hostiles’ tribes), with nearly twice as many actively comfortable with immigration (Carter, 2018). An ‘anxious middle’ (the ‘Immigrant ambivalent’ and the ‘Culturally concerned’) made up 40% of the population, indicating an overall outlook that was not negative towards refugees and migrants (ibid.).

Figure 3 Levels of immigration and shifting public attitudes




Note: This graphic shows immigration flows mapped against public attitudes. Attitudes have been measured by the British Election Study surveys over various years since 1963 and Ipsos MORI polling since 1989. These surveys report what percentage of Britons feel there are too many immigrants in the country.

Source: British Election Study, n.d.; Ipsos MORI, 2012; Office of National Statistics, 2020a

In October 2020, new segmentation data was published by More in Common (Juan-Torres et al., 2020). This divided the population into seven different groups and analysed their perspectives on a range of issues including immigration (see Box 3). According to this analysis four groups (Progressive Activists, Civic Pragmatists, Disengaged Battlers and Established Liberals) are actively comfortable with immigration, distinguishing them clearly from the other three (Loyal Nationals, Disengaged Traditionalists and Backbone Conservatives) who have more negative views. Immigration is the third highest cause of division, according to this study, with Loyal Nationals and Backbone Conservatives in particular worrying that immigrants do not share the same values or commitment to the country (Juan-Torres et al., 2020). Overall, when asked about the impact of immigration, an average of 43% across all groups say it has been positive, 27% say it has been neither positive nor negative and 30% report the impact as negative (see Box 3 for more details including the differences between the segments on this issue).

Box 3 Segmentation of the UK population and how positively or negatively they see immigration



Source: Juan-Torres et al., 2020

Progressive Activists (13% of the population): ‘A powerful and vocal group for whom politics is at the core of their identity, and who seek to correct the historic marginalisation of groups based on their race, gender, sexuality, wealth and other forms of privilege. They are politically-engaged, critical, opinionated, frustrated, cosmopolitan and environmentally conscious.’

Civic Pragmatists (13% of the population): ‘A group that cares about others, at home or abroad, and who are turned off by the divisiveness of politics. They are charitable, concerned, exhausted, community-minded, open to compromise, and socially liberal.’

Disengaged Battlers (12% of the population): ‘A group that feels that they are just keeping their heads above water, and who blame the system for its unfairness. They are tolerant, insecure, disillusioned, disconnected, overlooked, and socially liberal.’

Established Liberals (12% of the population): ‘A group that has done well and means well towards others, but also sees a lot of good in the status quo. They are comfortable, privileged, cosmopolitan, trusting, confident, and pro-market.’


Loyal Nationals (17% of the population): ‘A group that is anxious about the threats facing Britain and facing themselves. They are proud, patriotic, tribal, protective, threatened, aggrieved, and frustrated about the gap between the haves and the have-nots.’

Disengaged Traditionalists (18% of the population): ‘A group that values a well-ordered society and takes pride in hard work, and wants strong leadership that keeps people in line. They are self-reliant, ordered, patriotic, tough-minded, suspicious, and disconnected.’

Backbone Conservatives (15% of the population): ‘A group who are proud of their country, optimistic about Britain’s future outside of Europe, and who keenly follow the news, mostly via traditional media sources. They are nostalgic, patriotic, stalwart, proud, secure, confident, and relatively engaged with politics.’ (Juan-Torres et al., 2020: 8).

As Box 3 shows, three groups have very positive views about the impact of immigration (Progressive Activists, Civic Pragmatists and Established Liberals). Of the three groups that have more negative views ‘only Loyal Nationals have a majority that thinks the impact of immigration has been negative. This shows that even among the immigration-sceptic segments, opinion is mostly not stridently anti-immigration, but instead reflects mixed views’ (Juan-Torres et al., 2020: 210). Similarly, van Rens and Krasodonski-Jones (2019: 14) found that 32% of respondents neither agreed nor disagreed with the statement that ‘too many immigrants are coming to live in the UK’, ‘indicating that a significant proportion of people hold more nuanced views on immigration’. This analysis indicates that there is space to engage with public attitudes as long as the messages are tailored to different segments.

Since the 2016 referendum, the salience of immigration as an issue of concern has declined sharply: as of July 2021, only 12% of respondents see immigration as a key concern (Rolfe et al., 2021). As Figure 4 illustrates, long-term polling data shows that concerns about immigration have fallen to their lowest level in two decades. This is partly because many believe that the ‘problem’ of immigration has now been solved by the vote to leave the EU, and fewer refugees and other migrants will come to the UK after Brexit (Schwartz et al., 2021). Indeed, Ipsos MORI (2018b) found that equal proportions of survey respondents felt more positive due to immigrants’ contributions to the UK (39%) and due to fewer immigrants coming to the UK because of the referendum and Brexit (41%).

Figure 4 Salience of immigration as a key issue in the UK

Note: Data supplied by Ipsos MORI. This figure shows the percentage of people answering ‘immigration/race problems’ to the question ‘What do you see as the most/other important issues facing Britain today?’

Source: Ipsos MORI

The UK is among European countries with the most positive attitudes towards immigration (Ipsos MORI, 2017; 2018b). Polling suggests that people feel that those who have come to the UK legally, abide by the rules and contribute while they are in the country should be allowed to stay. In a survey after the EU referendum, the majority of those polled (84%), including a majority who voted to leave the EU (77%), strongly supported the protection of EU migrants’ rights after Brexit (Ford and Sobolewska, 2018). Following the Windrush scandal, a majority polled (64%) favoured an immigration system that protected those who have a legal right to be in the UK over one that prioritises deporting illegal immigrants (Ipsos MORI, 2018a).

The number of people who believe there are too many migrants in the UK has consistently fallen – from more than 80% of respondents in the British Election Study (n.d.) in the 1960s to 53% in 2019. In a 2021 poll, only 45% of participants wanted immigration numbers reduced – the lowest percentage compared to all previous waves of data, with a steady decrease from almost 70% in February 2015 (Ipsos MORI, 2020; Rolfe et al., 2021). Although the public often underestimate the economic contribution of migrants, fewer people now believe that immigrants take jobs and welfare services away from Britons (Ipsos MORI, 2019). In fact, European migrants living in the UK contribute £2,300 more to the public purse each year than the average adult, with the average European migrant arriving in the UK in 2016 contributing £78,000 more than they take out in public services and benefits over their time spent in the UK (Oxford Economics, 2018).

There has also been a shift in attitudes when looking specifically at refugees. In previous multi-country surveys, Britons have been the most negative towards refugee assistance (Tent Foundation, 2016). However, there are some signs that this is changing, with a recent poll by Ipsos MORI (2021) finding British respondents some of the most positive surveyed in terms of accepting refugees into their country: almost three in four surveyed believed that refugees should be allowed to live in other countries, including their own country, to escape war and persecution, and more than half the population believe the UK should be either more open or remain the same in terms of welcoming refugees since the Covid-19 pandemic.

4 Two popular narratives


Current discourse around migration is highly polarised, with perceptions split between narratives of perceived threat, positive narratives and an anxious middle that could be convinced by either narrative depending on the context (Dempster and Hargrave, 2017).

- In the **‘threat’ narrative**, immigration is seen as threatening British values, culture and living standards, public services and security through rising extremism and criminality. These themes are considerably more heightened in discussions of non-white and more culturally distinct individuals (Dempster and Hargrave, 2017).
- **‘Positive’ narratives** initially centred on celebrating diversity, in line with UK integration policies that promoted positive race relations and multiculturalism. More recently, the narrative has shifted to celebrating commonalities, seen in campaigns such as Citizens UK’s Refugees Welcome and More in Common’s Great Get Together (Crawley and McMahon, 2016). This new focus relies on ‘contact theory’, based on Gallup polls that indicate that acceptance of migrants increases with social interaction (Esipova et al., 2017). Another ‘positive’ strategy is to amplify migrant and refugee voices in the media through human interest stories in the hope of engaging the ‘anxious middle’ (Dempster and Hargrave, 2017).

The ‘positive’ narrative has helped shift the attitudes of some people: 21% of Britons surveyed by Ipsos MORI in 2019 say they have become more positive towards immigration. Half of those say that this is down to positive narratives on immigration, which made them more aware of how much immigrants contribute to the UK, both economically and culturally (see Figure 5; Ipsos MORI, 2019). However, it is less clear that these messages have affected people who feel threatened by immigration and have concerns that do not necessarily relate to the economy.

As Figure 5 illustrates, over the past two decades positive attitudes have been increasing and – since the EU referendum – negative attitudes have dropped sharply. More recent data from Ipsos MORI (July 2021) confirms similar findings, with 46% of Britons holding positive views about the impact of immigration and only 28% holding negative views, with the positive shift occurring since May 2015 (Rolfe et al., 2021). Overall, therefore, attitudes towards migration have shifted from mostly negative to mostly positive. The notable shift towards more positive attitudes after the referendum suggests that people are likely to be influenced by electoral campaigning and messaging devised to harness the high political salience of migration, rather than public attitudes being grounded in personal beliefs and entrenched views. This calls for new and different ways to engage the public, starting with what matters to them, steering the focus and attention away from migration as a standalone issue.

Figure 5 Attitudes towards immigration



Note: This data has been extracted from each wave of the European Social Survey. Results are coded from 0 to 10, with ‘don’t know’ also recorded. We have classified survey respondents who scored 0–4 in their answers to the question ‘Does immigration make the UK a worse or better place to live?’ as holding ‘negative’ views, those scoring 5 as being ‘indecisive’ and those scoring 6–10 as holding ‘positive’ views.

Source: European Social Survey, n.d.

Recent events, such as the ‘Black Lives Matter’ movement, have thrown new narratives into the mix, where immigration is framed in terms of ‘displacing traditional white British cultures and communities’ and ‘opposition to immigration as racist or white supremacist’ (Juan-Torres et al., 2020: 221). This point-counterpoint should be avoided, as it is likely to increase polarisation. Instead, narratives that ‘engage the values, concerns, and motivations of different segments, rather than others’ characterisations of them’ should be used to avoid over-simplifying a complex issue (ibid.).

5 Implications for public and private investors

The UK economy and businesses stand to profit from the skills and innovation offered by refugees and other migrants, with a 2015 report by the UK government noting that migrant employees ‘not only stimulate growth for British business by introducing new ideas and innovations but bring their unique overseas networks and cultural knowledge to drive expansion for their company abroad’ (Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, 2015).

There is substantial evidence that migrants have a positive effect on both businesses and the wider economy, with a 1% increase in the migrant share of the population creating a 2% increase in income per head (Legrain, 2018). Research has shown that companies in the United States that support refugees increase their own brand awareness and attract consumer support, particularly among millennial consumers, women and people of colour (Erdem et al., 2018). Companies also stand to benefit from refugee recruitment, as refugees have a lower turnover rate than other employees (Dyssegaard Kallick and Roldan, 2018). Given the positive effects of immigration on productivity and shared economic benefits, businesses and investors could do more to help foster social cohesion, expand employment opportunities for refugees and other migrants and combat the narrative that they take jobs away from British citizens.

There is public demand for an immigration system that helps Britain recover from the economic downturn due to Brexit and Covid-19. A majority of respondents in a 2021 poll agreed that businesses should be able to recruit migrants for positions in key services, including health and social care (see Box 1); for temporary seasonal work where needed, such as in the agricultural or hospitality sector (67%); and to fill any jobs where there are shortages of available workers (65%) (Rolfe et al., 2021).

Based on this analysis there is scope for companies and investors to engage more to support refugees and other migrants in ways that are beneficial for their businesses as well as for local communities. Box 4 provides some examples of good practice in businesses engaging with the integration of refugees and other migrants in the UK.

Box 4 Examples of good business practice

The Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development (CIPD) notes the importance of comprehensive induction and orientation programmes to aid the development of migrant workers in UK companies (CIPD, 2021). These approaches help ensure that companies maximise the potential of migrant workers for their own and the companies' development and help integration.

In 2016, the **Institute of Directors** released a report demonstrating the success stories of migrant entrepreneurs in the UK (dos Santos and Silvester, 2016). The report drew on personal stories to challenge the belief that migrants cost the UK economically by showcasing migrants' economic creativity as entrepreneurs. The project also suggested key policy recommendations to government to help migrant entrepreneurs contribute more to the UK economy.

The fashion brand **Jigsaw** ran a 'love immigration campaign' in answer to the idea that immigration threatens 'British values', stating that 'British Style is not 100 per cent British. In fact, there's no such thing as 100 per cent British' (Featherstone, 2017). The campaign emphasised that, without immigration, Jigsaw wouldn't be Jigsaw. From the Afghan Coat that Jigsaw first produced to the 45 nationalities it employs across the business, immigration and cultural diversity has helped Jigsaw define 'British style' on the high street.

In 2017 **Starbucks** pledged to hire 10,000 refugees worldwide, with 500 jobs for refugees in the UK (Refugee Council, n.d.). The Refugee Council uses its networks of refugees and refugee-supporting organisations to help advertise job opportunities and the company's training programme for refugees ensures that they gain wider skills.

Transitions matches refugees with appropriate business opportunities for six-month internships that can transition into a permanent job (Transitions, n.d.). These internships, which help refugees build the necessary experience to find a permanent position, can be particularly significant as some refugees find it difficult to provide evidence of past employment.

Businesses and investors looking to change public attitudes towards migrants and refugees should seek partnerships which best reach those 'segments' of the UK population open and susceptible to positive influence on the topic. Key considerations should include:

1. **The use of 'trusted' messengers.** While politicians and the media are less likely to be trusted influencers, research has shown that 'regular' people, such as local media personalities, civil society organisations and those who have welcomed refugees and other migrants into their communities, are the most trusted and effective messengers (Dempster and Hargrave, 2017).

2. **Messages which demonstrate commonality and integration** and dispel perceptions of the ‘threat’ narrative through emotive and personal means rather than facts and statistics. Most importantly, highlighting collective benefits for all is key, with an emphasis on the communities that feel most threatened by immigration.
3. **Innovative partnerships** are needed between organisations in the migration and refugee sector, businesses and other local groups to share expertise and harness the resources and skills of business to achieve shared goals.

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